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[A continuing offence is one which takes more than one act to prove the 
charge.  Probably the best known is consorting but there are others.  New 
legislation has introduced some serious continuing offences.  Stalking and 
maintaining a sexual relationship with a young person are two of them.  
Others are hybrids: those which can be proved by one act or many.  The best 
examples are drug trafficking or supplying.  I examine them all.  They are 
exceptions to the basic legal principle of one criminal act for each charge.  I 
finish with a possible jury direction.] 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Some offences are of their very nature continuing offences. By that I mean that the 
evidence of a number of criminal acts is required to prove the single offence. Thus 
one count or charge properly recites the crime. Those continuing offences originally 
included consorting and other offences which often have gerunds as a description of 
the offence: keeping, living, suffering, permitting and frequenting are some of 
them. These offences are all statutory and seem to have been intended to be dealt 
with summarily.1  They are social order offences designed to avoid nuisance being 
caused to citizens of good morals and sober habits. The gaming offences were 
obviously intended to protect young men of sporting inclination from being taken 
down by cardsharps and cheats.  The bawdy house offences are designed to safe-
guard public morals.  These are offences that have been on the books for well over 
a century. In Hussein Buchanan JA said, “Continuous offences are well known to 
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the law, especially in cases of conspiracy, public nuisance, harassment and certain 
statutory offences such as living on the earnings of a prostitute.”2    
 
But in more recent times other serious statutory offences have been introduced.  
Maintaining a sexual relationship with a young person is a serious offence. To make 
out the offence a number of sexual acts with a child must be proved. The general 
rule is that there is to be only one criminal act per count because otherwise there is 
an irresistible implication of the accused’s propensity to commit crimes in general 
or certain crimes in particular.  That general rule is abrogated by the statute by 
which this offence is created. The statutory offence of stalking falls into the same 
category.  
 
There are yet other offences which will allow evidence to be given of more than 
one criminal act if that is the nature of the prosecution case.  Conspiracy is a good 
example.   But there are other very serious offences which fall into this category.  
They are the offences which involve carrying on the business of drug dealing. In the 
prosecution of a single count of that serious offence the prosecution can lead evi-
dence of a number of drug deals.  The purpose of this article is to examine what are 
and what are not continuing offences, to see how the courts have interpreted the 
legislation which creates those offences, and to derive from these what a jury is to 
be directed by a judge.  
 
II DISCRETE OFFENCES 
First I will look briefly at what have been regarded as wrongly charging continuing 
offences by allowing evidence of more than one criminal act in one charge.   
 
The starting point is Walsh v Tattersall.3  The High Court of Australia found 3-2 
that false applications for social security benefits are discrete offences.  It was not 
proper to regard them as continuous by charging them all as one offence.  Other 
Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal decisions were to the same effect.  In Trotter4  
the accused had been charged with what was in effect one indecent assault.   The 
victim gave evidence of two events.  The Court held that only one event should 
have been allowed to be decided by the jury, and because of the evidence of the two 
the jury’s verdict was either uncertain or lacked unanimity. The principle in Trotter 
has been later applied.5 
 
                                                            
1
 Some of the old offences have been abolished in Australia such as being a rogue or vagabond.  But 
while the offence existed, a single charge of a number of acts was not bad for duplicity: Loftus v Wood-
worth [1936] VLR 279; Walsh v. Tattersall, (1996) 188 CLR 77, 91. (For some history of that offence 
see Ledwith v. Roberts, [1937] 1 KB 232).  
2
 DPP (Cth) v. Hussein, (2003) 8 VR 92, 97.  Buchanan JA gave the leading judgment of the Court of 
Appeal. 
3
  Walsh v. Tattersall, (1996) 186 CLR 77. 
4
  R v. Trotter, (1982) 7 A Crim R 8 (Vic CCA). 
5
  R v. Suckling, (1998) 104 A Crim R 59 (Vic CCA). 
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Latent ambiguity is the term used in Johnson v Miller6 to describe evidence of more 
than one act led on a single count.  It has also been described as latent uncertainty.7  
Kirby J summed it up: “…save for statutory warrant and for the exceptional cases 
of continuing offences or facts so closely related that they amount to the one activ-
ity, separate offences should be the subject of separate charges.” 8  Some further 
examples. The wrongful erection of an advertising sign was not a continuing of-
fence notwithstanding that defendant kept it there for some time.9 Nor was an 
offence of having an unsafe work environment.10 Escape from custody occurs when 
the break for freedom is made.   It is not a continuing offence of being at large.11 
 
III CONTINUING OFFENCES 
Now something of continuing offences, that is those which require proof of a num-
ber of acts to make out the single offence. 
A Consorting 
Legislation creates the offence of consorting. Typically it is expressed in the fol-
lowing way: 
 
A person who habitually consorts with reputed thieves, prostitutes or per-
sons having no lawful visible means of support is guilty of an offence 12 
 
Consorting means “some seeking or acceptance of the association with other speci-
fied persons on the part of a defendant (Brown v Bryan [1963] Tas SR 1 at 2)” 13 
 
By the legislation the consorting must be habitual.  In Dias v O’Sullivan Mayo J 
said:  
‘Habitually’ requires a continuance and permanence of some tendency, 
something that has developed into a propensity, that is present from day to 
day.  A habit results from a condition of mind that has become stereotyped.   
In terms of conduct its presence is demonstrated by the frequency of acts 
that by repetition have acquired the characteristic of being customary or 
usual; behaviour that is to be regarded as almost inevitable when the ap-
propriate conditions are present.  The tendency will ordinarily be required 
                                                            
6
  Johnson v. Miller, (1937) 59 CLR 467, per Dixon J at 486. 
7
  R v.Walsh, (2002) 131 A Crim R 299 (Vic CA) per Phillips and Buchanan JJ at 309. 
8
  Walsh v. Tattersall, (1996) 186 CLR 77, 112. 
9
  Superliquorman Hotels (Napier) Ltd v. Napier City Council, [1984] 1 NZLR 58, 60-61 (CA). 
10
 Chugg v. Pacific Dunlop Ltd, [1988] VR 411; Meiklejohn v. Central Norseman Gold Corporation Ltd, 
(1998) 19 WAR 298. 
11
 R v. Scott, [1967] VR 276 (CCA) per Smith J at 285-6. 
12
 Vagrants, Gaming and other Offences Act, 1931, s 4(1)(d) (Qld); Police Act, 1892, s 65(9) (WA); 
Police Offences Act, 1935, s 6 (Tas); Summary Offences Act s 56(1)(I) (NT); Crimes Act ,1900, s 546A 
(NSW); Vagrancy Act, 1958, s 6(c) (Vic); Summary Offences Act, 1953, (SA) s 13.  There is no equiva-
lent legislation in ACT but Legislation Act 2001 deals with continuingg offences without naming any. 
13
 Johanson v. Dixon, (1979) 143 CLR 376, 383 (Mason J) and  395 (Aickin J). 
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to be demonstrated by numerous instances of reiteration.14 (emphasis 
added)  
 
So in Jan v Fingleton 15 the information was held proper which contained one count 
charging the offence between given dates. 
 
B Keeping a brothel (bawdy house) 
Keeping an unlicensed brothel is an offence created by legislation16 although it may 
also be an offence at common law.17 
 
“Keeping” imports that the person is carrying on his own business or is managing 
those premises.18 The offence is made out if the premises are used to organize 
assignations.19 But it must be a business.  A woman on her own receiving callers 
does not keep a bawdy house.20 
 
C Keeping a common gaming house 
Legislation prohibits the keeping of a common gaming house.21 I will not deal with 
the question of what is a prohibited game, however described. 
 
Most of the legislation refers to a common gaming house being “kept or used”.  The 
words have been held to import the carrying on of a business.22 Thus “kept” would 
have the same meaning as in keeping a brothel.  “Used” has been interpreted as not 
including the playing of an unlawful game once between friends.23  Salmond J said:  
 
A gaming house is the place of business of a man who in the way of busi-
ness affords facilities to others to indulge in the practice of gaming there 
either with himself or with themselves.24 
 
 
                                                            
14
 Dias v. O’Sullivan, [1949] SASR 195, 200-201. 
15
 Jan v. Fingleton, (1983) 32 SASR 379; 9 A Crim R 293 (FC). 
16
 Criminal Code, s 209 (WA); Criminal Code, s 143 (Tas); Prostitution Regulation Act, s 4 (NT); 
Summary Offences Act, 1988, s 17 (NSW); Prostitution Control Act 1994 (Vic); Criminal Law Consoli-
dation Act s 270(1); Summary Offences Act, 1953, s 28 (SA); Prostitution Act 1992 (ACT). 
17
 R v. Rahme, (1993) 70 A Crim R 357 (NSW CCA).      
18
 R v. Rahme, (1993) 70 A Crim R 357, 364 (NSW CCA). 
19
 Samuels v. Bosch, (1972) 127 CLR 517 (High Court of Australia, 1972); Ferricks v. Guzikowski, 
(1990) 51 A Crim R 78 (Qld FC). 
20
 R v. Krausky, [1990] 2 Qd R 177. 
21
 Criminal Code, s 232 (Qld); Gaming Commission Act 1987, s 41 (WA); Racing and Gaming Act, 
1952, ss 93 and 112 (Tas); Gaming Act, s 60 (NT); Unlawful Gambling Act 1998, ss 4 and 48 (NSW); 
Lotteries Gaming and Betting Act 1966, s 12 (Vic); Lottery and Gaming Act 1936, s 4 (SA); Gaming 
and Betting Act 1903, s 3 (ACT).  
22
 Dolling v. Bird, [1924] NZLR 545. 
23
 R v. Davies, [1897] 2 QB 199 (CCR). 
24
 Weathered v. Fitzgibbon, [1925] NZLR 331. 
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D Living on the earnings of prostitution 
There is no corresponding offence at common law.  The legislation in such jurisdic-
tions as deal with the activity creates an offence where a person “…knowingly lives 
wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution”.25 
 
I will not concern myself with the provisions which deal with proof.   My interest is 
to examine how the courts interpret “live in whole or in part”. The word “living” 
seems like a continuous activity.  The case of R v Hill 26 points up some real diffi-
culties of interpretation of “living”. Strange to say this case was prosecuted on 
indictment and the conviction was hence by jury verdict. The court found this mode 
of prosecution proper.  But on the issue of the framing of the charge and on the 
admissibility of evidence, the arguments of counsel for the appellant are more fully 
set out in the Criminal Appeal Report.  Mr Hill had been convicted of living in part 
on the earnings of one prostitute on a certain day and of another prostitute on the 
same day. Each charge was contained in a separate count. It seems that evidence 
was also given of other, what must have been similar, acts of Mr Hill with one of 
the prostitutes.  I assume it would have been making assignations or taking money.   
The argument was put that it was impossible to conceive of one day as “living”.   
The alternative argument is better described as a paradox. Notwithstanding that one 
day could not be described as living, the introduction of evidence of his activities 
on other days was the cause of prejudice and embarrassment.    The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeal in a shorter than one page judgment which was the judicial fashion of 
the day, disposed of this argument briefly:  
 
He was indicted for having lived on the earnings of prostitution upon one 
specified day only, and it was contended that the indictment was therefore 
bad.   It was also contended that evidence was not admissible on the in-
dictment as laid, of anything done on any day except the day specified.   
We do not agree with either contention.   The indictment charging the of-
fence on that way is perfectly good, and there is no ground for saying that 
evidence is not admissible to show what the appellant’s relations with the 
woman in question had been either before or after the day specified on the 
indictment, as such evidence is clearly relevant to the question whether he 
was or was not, on the day specified, living on the earnings of her prostitu-
tion.27 
 
                                                            
25
 Police Act 1892, s 76G(1) (WA); Summary Offences Act 1988, s 15(1) (NSW); Prostitution Control 
Act 1994, s 10(1) (Vic); Summary Offences Act 1953, s 26(1) (SA). 
26
 R v. Hill; R v. Churchman, [1914] 2 KB 386; 10 Cr App R 56 (CCA). 
27
 R v. Hill, [1914] KB 389-390 (CCA). Cr App R has a different version.  
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E Suffering 
Suffering prostitutes to assemble in a refreshment house was once an offence. 28    
In  Csomor v  Haberman 29 Herring CJ approved an appeal which had struck out the 
conviction of Mr Csomor.  The evidence given in the case is instructive.  Mr Cso-
mor ran the “Red Tulip” restaurant at 135 Bridge Road Richmond, Victoria.  It 
provided meals. There was a small dance floor.  The charge was that the defendant 
“on 23 February 1958 did suffer prostitutes or persons of notoriously bad character 
to be assembled in premises known as the ‘Red Tulip’ restaurant”.    The evidence 
was that police visited the restaurant on 23 February and saw five women there 
whom they identified as prostitutes.  The police pointed them out to Mr Csomor.  
More interesting for present purposes was the police evidence that on a number of 
occasions in the previous two months they had visited the restaurant, seen prosti-
tutes there and had pointed them out to Mr Csomor.  Some of those prostitutes there 
earlier were present on the night in question.   The conviction was set aside because 
there was no suggestion that any of the prostitutes at the restaurant were there to 
pursue their trade profession or calling individually or in company.  I assume that 
the judgement means that they were not there for that purpose on 23 February, but it 
may also mean that they were never there for that purpose.  Even prostitutes have to 
eat somewhere.  Conspicuous by its absence in the judgment is any suggestion that 
the police evidence of what was seen and done on their visits before 23 February 
was improperly received.   I suspect that the reason for this is that “suffers” imputes 
a continuous offence so as to make such evidence admissible. 
  
Lest this piece of legislation sounds like a voice from another world, the offence 
still exists in a modified form.  In Victoria, Summary Offences Act 1966 s 20(1) 
provides: 
Any person who allows in any house building tent or other premises 
wherein liquors provisions or refreshments are sold or disposed of any 
drunkenness or other disorderly conduct or suffers persons of notoriously 
bad character to frequent his premises shall be guilty of an offence. (em-
phasis added). 
 
The new section is more likely to allow evidence of other acts because of the 
use of the verb “frequent”.    
 
The word suffer can also seemingly include a continuous act on one occasion.  In 
Douglas-Brown v Commissioner of Police 30 the liquidator of the Castle Hotel was 
alleged to have been in breach of the liquor licence by allowing scantily dressed 
young ladies to dance in a lewd manner in the hotel.  That is legalese for strippers.  
It was never part of the case that there was only one act.  The ladies put on per-
formances.  A similar example can be found in permitting a person to drive and 
keep on driving.31 
                                                            
28
 Police Offences Act 1957 (Vic), s 32. 
29
 Csomor v.  Haberman, [1960] VR 153 (Herring CJ). 
30
 Douglas-Brown v. Commissioner of Police, (1995) 13 WAR 41 (FC). 
31
 Evans v. Accident Insurance Insurance Mutual Holdings & Anor, (1997) 26 MVR 83 (Qld CA). 
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And when a landlord knew that his demised premises were being unlawfully used, 
had the power to prevent that use and did not prevent it, he was said to “suffer” a 
use contrary to the Development Act 1993 (SA).32 
 
F Permitting 
Permitting connotes a continuing activity.  In Proudman v Dayman 33 Mrs Proud-
man was convicted of “permitting” an unlicensed person to drive. Young v Austra-
lian Workers’ Union 34 turned on whether Mr and Mrs Young had permitted two 
shearers they employed to use wide comb shears.  There were separate complaints 
for each shearer, but it seems implicit in the facts referred to in the judgment that 
each shearer used wide combs for the whole of one day.  
 
It is not unusual for a statute proscribing an offence to characterise the act as “suffer 
or permit”.  An example was the charge in Rahme.  In Tasmania a person occupy-
ing premises shall not “permit or suffer any breach of the peace” (Police Offences 
Act 1935 s 10).  In WA it is an offence to “permit or suffer prostitutes…to meet 
together and remain” in certain premises (Police Act 1892 s 84). 
 
But permit, as a verb, seems to be used to refer at least to a prolonged event.     
Sweet v Parsley 35 and R  v Souter 36 both turned on the construction of  permitting 
premises to be used for the smoking of cannabis (contrary to statute) when in each 
case it was clear that the smoking had gone on for a considerable time. 
 
G Frequent 
Frequent as a verb appears in a number of statutes.  I have already referred to Sum-
mary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) s 20.  Another example comes from South Australia.   
There it is an offence to be the occupier of premises “frequented by reputed thieves 
prostitutes…” and other specified persons (Summary Offences Act 1953 s 21). 
 
The word is in legislation of long standing.  Two examples from the cases will 
suffice.  Annie Macmanamny was charged in 1899 with “being a suspected person 
she did frequent Elizabeth Street Melbourne with intent to commit a felony”.   
A’Beckett J confirmed her conviction but observed “evidence of presence in the 
street on one day would not justify a conviction under the section”.37  Edward 
Whiting was held to have been properly convicted of being the occupier of a house 
frequented by reputed thieves. Hood J found “The fact that five reputed 
                                                            
32
 Wright v. City of West Torrens Corporation, (1996) 91 LGERA 197. 
33
 Proudman v. Dayman, (1941) 67 CLR 536. 
34
 Young v. Australian Workers’ Union, (1974) 5 ALR 347 (Aust Ind Ct). 
35
 Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
36
 R  v. Souter, [1971] 1 WLR 1187 (CCA). 
37
 Macmanamny v. Harcourt, (1899) 25 VLR 47, 49-50 (A’Beckett J). 
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thieves…were found there on three occasions is sufficient evidence of frequent-
ing.”38 
 
These legislative provisions show that more than one act is required to be proved in 
order to make out the offence. 
 
H Stalking 
Another gerund. The offence is one that has had only recent legislative recogni-
tion.39 
 
It is abundantly clear from the legislation in each jurisdiction that the proof of the 
offence requires evidence of a course of conduct or of at least two separate acts.   In 
construing the Victorian legislation in Gunes v Pearson, McDonald J said: 
 
For a person to engage in conduct which attracts the application of s 21A 
of the Crimes Act that which must be engaged in must be a course of con-
duct …which is protracted or conduct which must be engaged in on more 
than one occasion. 40   
 
On the occasions which the prosecution allege, the prosecution must prove each act 
beyond reasonable doubt.41 
  
I Maintaining a sexual relationship with a young person 
Again, this offence was created by fairly recent legislation.42  The conduct made 
criminal is having continuing sexual dealings with a person under a certain age.   It 
is an extended version of what used to be called carnal knowledge. In those old 
sections sexual intercourse was prohibited with any girl under the age of 16 years, 
and if the man were 21 or older, there was to be no intercourse with a girl under 18 
years.  Consent of the girl was no defence. 
 
Where there is more than one sexual act with a person who is under the prescribed 
age, the offence is maintaining a sexual relationship with a young person (Different 
jurisdictions may describe the offence differently, but the meaning is the same).  
Again, consent is no defence. The culpability of the offences can be gauged by the 
difference in penalty.  In Victoria for example, an act of sexual penetration with a 
                                                            
38
 Coonan v. Whiting, [1919] VLR 548, 541 (Hood J). 
39
 Criminal Code s 359A (Qld); Criminal Code s 338D (WA); Criminal Code s 192 (Tas); Criminal Code 
s 189 (NT); Crimes Act 1900, s 562AB (NSW); Crimes Act 1958, s 21A (Vic); Criminal Law Consoli-
dation Act, 1935, s 19AA (SA); Crimes Act, 1900, s 35 (ACT). 
40
 Gunes v. Pearson, (1996) 89 A Crim R 297, 306 Vic, McDonald J). 
41
 R v. Hubbuck, [1999] 1 Qd R 314 (CA ) 
42
 Criminal Code, s 229B (Qld); Criminal Code, s 321A (WA); Criminal Code, s 125A and 337B (Tas); 
Criminal Code, s 131A (NT); Crimes Act 1900, s 66EA (NSW); Crimes Act 1958, s 47A (Vic); Criminal 
Law Consolidation Act 1935, s 74 (SA); Crimes Act 1900, s 92EA (ACT). 
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child between 10 and 16 attracts a maximum of 10 years imprisonment.  Maintain-
ing a sexual relationship with a child under the age of 16 attracts a 25 year maxi-
mum.43  The essence of this single offence is a number of sexual acts which do not 
have to be the same sort. 
 
The elements of this offence were isolated by Malcolm CJ in R v GP.  His Honour 
said:  
The offence…is committed when, on three or more separate days, a person 
does an act in relation to a child which would constitute an act of sexually 
penetrating or indecent dealing with the child.  The fact that the child is 
under the age of 16 years is an element of the offence…The absence of 
consent is not an element of the offence.44 
 
There are some riders.  In many charges based on sexual acts, the principal prosecu-
tion witness will give evidence of many more sexual encounters than are necessary 
to prove the case.  In that event the jury must be directed that they must agree on 
the same three acts on the same occasions.45  A propensity warning may have to be 
given but it depends on the circumstances of the case.46 
 
IV SINGLE OR CONTINUING OFFENCES 
Some offences may be committed by one act.  For example, one act of some drug 
trading will constitute an offence; but a number of acts can still be the subject of a 
single charge.  In that way the offences are no different from conspiracy. 
   
A Carrying on the business of unlawful trafficking in drugs 
(Qld) 
The offence is created by Drugs Misuse Act 1986 s 5.  Clearly enough, from the 
wording of the section evidence may be led of a number of drug transactions on a 
single charge.  Courts have interpreted the section in that way. 47 
 
Yet in jurisdictions where the word “trafficking” is used, courts have concluded that 
the words creating the offence can contemplate a prosecution allegation of carrying 
on a business. 48 
 
 
                                                            
43
 The longest recent sentence was six years imprisonment with a minimum of four years: DPP v. WJW, 
(2000) 2 VR 497 (CA). 
44
 R v. GP, (1997) 18 WAR 196, 199 (CCA). 
45
 KBT v. The Queen, (1997) 191 CLR 417. 
46
 KRM v. The Queen, (2001) 206 CLR 221. 
47
 R v. Elhusseini, [1988] 2 Qd R 442; 33 A Crim R 155 (CCA). 
48
 Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic) ss 71-71AC; see also Drugs Misuse Act 
1986 (Qld) s 5(1); Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) s 32 A;  Misuse of Drugs Act 2001 (Tas) s 12.  
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B Trafficking in drugs: R v Giretti49    
In the interpretation of “trafficking” the courts have held: 
 
1. The offence can be made out by a single act of being “knowingly en-
gaged in the movement of the (specified) drugs from the source to the 
ultimate user in the course of an illicit trade in such drugs”.50 
2. The illicit trade can be conducted “without reward”. 
3. While possession of itself does not constitute trafficking, the deeming 
provisions of the legislation contemplate that only slight evidence of 
acts which might amount to trafficking might be all that is necessary 
to complete the prosecution case. 51 
4. Trafficking can be a business.   Where that is the prosecution case, 
evidence can be led of many acts of drug dealing on a presentment or 
indictment containing a single count. 52  The High Court refused spe-
cial leave to appeal from Giretti.53  More recently the decision seems 
to have been referred to with approval by the High Court in Walsh v 
Tattersall. 54  
5. In a Giretti trafficking, the prosecution may allege in one count that 
the accused was conducting the business of trafficking in drugs and 
for that purpose leads evidence of a number of transactions.  In such a 
case the prosecution may fail to prove a number of the dealings on 
which it has relied to show that a business was being conducted.   In 
that event the jury is not to be invited  to return a guilty verdict if for 
example only one transaction is established.  When the prosecution al-
leges business, business must be proved. 55 
6. A presentment may contain a Giretti business of trafficking count fol-
lowed by counts alleging particular trafficking transactions. 56 
7. An accused can still be charged with conspiracy to traffick a drug of 
dependence. On such a charge a one count presentment the prosecu-
tion can adduce evidence of many acts of drug dealing.57 
 
 
 
                                                            
49
 R v. Giretti, (1986) 24 A Crim R 112 (CCA). 
50
 Falconer v. Pedersen, [1974] VR 185, 188 (Anderson J); R v. Holman, [1982] VR 471, 475 (CCA). 
51
 R v. Elem, [1982] VR 295, 299 (CCA). 
52
 R v. Giretti, (1986) 24 A Crim R 112 (CCA). 
53
 The refusal of special leave does not of itself establish a precedent: Sir Anthony Mason, Use And 
Abuse of Precedent,  4 AUST RALIAN BAR REV. 93, 96-98 (1988). 
54
 Walsh v. Tattersall, (1996) 188 CLR 77, 87 (Dawson and Toohey JJ), and at 93, 104 and 108 (Kirby J) 
. In KRM v. The Queen, (2001) 206 CLR 221, 260 Kirby J again referred to Giretti with approval. The 
only reservation expressed by Kirby J, is that the jury should be given a strong propensity warning.  
55
 R v. Komljenovic, (1994) 76 A Crim R 521, 550 (Vic CCA). 
56
 R v. Te, [1998] 3 VR 566, 575-578; 97 A Crim R 386, 395-399 (CA). 
57
 R v. Guy, (1991) 57 A Crim R 21 (Vic CCA). 
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C Supplying drugs 58  
The propositions on “supply” accord with the position on “trafficking”.  In Hamzy 
59
 Hunt CJ at CL approved Locchi 60 and said (at 348): 
 
…the Crown is entitled to plead in the one count a charge of supply where 
it intends to prove a number of individual acts of supply by the accused to 
different people at different times, provided that those acts can fairly and 
properly be identified as part of the same criminal enterprise or the one 
criminal activity, but the trial court has power to direct the Crown either to 
elect or to separate the offences where the indictment would otherwise 
produce an unfairness to the accused. 
 
The dicta of the High Court in Walsh v Tattersall already referred to also supported 
Hamzy.  In Pinkstone 61 the High Court reaffirmed the wide ambit of “supply”. 
 
D Cultivation of drugs 
In R v Whalen 62 the Court of Criminal Appeal approved the laying of a single count 
for cultivation of cannabis in different places.  The court cited the supply cases of 
Hamzy and Locchi as their reason. 
E Framing the charge 
Where the prosecution alleges a single act of, for example, trafficking in a drug of 
dependence, the count will simply plead that offence as having taken place on the 
date alleged.  Where the allegation is being involved in the business of trafficking, 
the count will usually be expressed in the following way: 
 
The Director of Public Prosecutions presents (name of accused) at (place 
or places) in the State of (named) between the 1st day of January and the 
31st day of December 2004 trafficked in a drug of dependence namely 
(drug identified for example, heroin or methylamphetamine or cannabis L 
or 3, 4 methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine (MDMA)). 
 
The prosecution will give particulars of the acts on which it relies to show that the 
trafficking was a business. 
  
 
 
 
                                                            
58
 Each jurisdiction has legislation proscribing supply. See DAVID ROSS QC, CRIME [19.3420] (2002). 
59
 R v. Hamzy, (1994) 74 A Crim R 341 (NSW CCA). 
60
 R v. Locchi, (1991) 22 NSWLR 309 CCA). 
61
 Pinkstone v. The Queen, (2004) 78 ALJR 797; 206 ALR 84. 
62
 R v. Whalen, (2003) 56 NSWLR 454, 469 (CCA). 
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F Sentencing in drug trafficking 
The sentences in drug trafficking vary as widely as the nature of the offences.  At 
the lowest end of the scale is one who possesses drugs in a sufficient quantity to 
amount to trafficking.  That is to say, no drugs ever change hands.  The trafficking 
is on the single date that the drugs are found in possession.  Depending on the 
amount, such a trafficker may expect a sentence of one year imprisonment or less.63  
At the other end of the range are those who engage in trafficking as a business, that 
is they are involved in the passage of drugs on a number of occasions, and amount 
involved is a commercial quantity as the Acts define. In line with ordinary princi-
ples, sentencing depends on the nature of the offence and the quality of the person 
who commits it.  For trafficking in a commercial quantity of heroin a young person 
may be sentenced to eight years.64  For a mature person trafficking in the same drug 
to sentence will be substantially longer.65  The longest sentence I have been able to 
find is 21 years imprisonment with a minimum of 17 years, approved as proper by 
the Victorian Court of Appeal.66 
 
G Conspiracy 
Conspiracy is complete as a crime when two or more agree to do an unlawful act, or 
a lawful act by unlawful means.  This is not the place to examine the elements, the 
intent and all the practice on the pleading of the charge.67  But while the offence is 
completed by the agreement alone, the proof is often of many criminal acts from 
which the agreement may be inferred.  There are any number of examples. 
 
V POSSIBLE DIRECTION 
 
As a means of concluding the article, what follows is a possible direction to the jury 
on a continuing offence charge. 
 
1. The accused is charged with (state offence). 
2. This is a criminal case and because of that the prosecution has to prove its case. 
3. The elements of the charge are these (list elements). 
4. You note that to prove its case the prosecution must prove each of those acts. 
5. The standard of proof is the highest known to the law: beyond reasonable 
doubt.   
6. The words beyond reasonable doubt are ordinary English words which mean 
just what they say. 
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 DPP v. Collins, [2004] VSCA 179 (CA). 
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 R v. Phung, (2003) 141 A Crim R 311. 
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 In R v. Dent, (2002) 132 A Crim R 151, 158 (Qld CA)  the term of imprisonment was 14 years. 
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 R v. Tong, [2003] VSCA 15 CA). 
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 See for example JC Smith, Proving Conspiracy, CRIM. L. REV., 386 [1996]; PETER GILLIES, THE LAW 
OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY  (2nd ed., 1990); ROSS, supra note 58, at [3.4200].  
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7. In a criminal case the person accused does not have to prove a thing. 
8. You must not reason that because you might be satisfied that the accused 
committed one of those acts that she is the sort of person who would have 
committed the others. 
9. You must deal with the evidence of each act separately (recite the evidence). 
10. If you are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of one of the acts then your 
verdict must be not guilty.  Only if you are satisfied of the happening of each of 
the acts can your verdict be guilty.  
 
